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Abstract 
Cognitive function requires the coordination of neural activity across many scales, from neurons and 
circuits to large-scale networks. As such, it is unlikely that an explanatory framework focused upon 
any single scale will yield a comprehensive theory of brain activity and cognitive function. Modelling 
and analysis methods for neuroscience should aim to accommodate multiscale phenomena. Emerging 
research now suggests that multi-scale processes in the brain arise from so-called critical phenomena 
that occur very broadly in the natural world. Criticality arises in complex systems perched between 
order and disorder, and is marked by fluctuations that do not have any privileged spatial or temporal 
scale. We review the core nature of criticality, the evidence supporting its role in neural systems and 
its explanatory potential in brain health and disease.  
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Highlights 
 Criticality is a wide-spread phenomenon in natural systems 
 Criticality provides a unifying framework to model and understand brain activity and 
cognitive function 
 Substantial evidence now supports the hypothesis that the brain operates near criticality  
 We review the role of criticality in healthy and pathological  brain dynamics 
 Caveats and pitfalls regarding the assessment of criticality in the brain are discussed  
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1. Introduction 
Enormous strides have been achieved in neuroscience across a hierarchy of scales of enquiry, from 
the variety of neural cell types and their molecular biology, through the function of cortical circuits 
and, in recent years, to the complex architecture of large-scale brain networks. Much of this success 
has been achieved within research silos, with a focus on scale-specific phenomena, partly mandated 
by the apertures of various imaging technologies and partly by the training and cultures within the 
various neuroscientific disciplines. Research in neuroscience also proceeds within a largely 
descriptive world-view, with increasing emphasis on the collation and statistical characterization of 
“big data” (Biswal et al., 2010; Markram et al., 2015). Whilst specific mechanisms have been 
elucidated across an array of basic and clinical neuroscience domains, important challenges remain to 
be addressed: First, since correlations between behaviour and neuronal activity have been documented 
at almost every scale of analysis, it seems unlikely that a description of the brain at any particular 
scale will be sufficient to describe brain function. How is neural activity integrated across scales to 
give rise to cognitive function? What are the mechanisms linking activity across scales? Second, brain 
function does not only rely upon the execution of particular functions, but also on adaptive switching 
from one function to another, depending on context and goals. What are the fundamental principles 
underlying such complex, flexible neuronal dynamics? Third, what are the major theoretical 
frameworks to explain and unify the properties of all the large volumes of data currently being 
accrued? Fourth, how is information encoded by neurons – in the entropy of individual spikes, or via 
likelihood functions encoded by the distributions of population activity? 
 
The principles that unify brain function across spatial and temporal scales remain largely unknown. 
However, comparable multi-scale challenges exist in other scientific disciplines. Meteorology, for 
example, spans scales from local wind gusts through regional weather systems up to global climate 
patterns. Each scale is nested within a larger scale, such that the local variance in wind gusts depends 
upon the regional weather, which is likewise constrained by global trends such as El Niño. 
Mathematicians and physicists have developed a considerable armoury of analytic tools to address 
multi-scale dynamics in a host of physical, biological and chemical systems (Bak et al., 1987). Chief 
amongst these is the notion of criticality, an umbrella term that denotes the behaviour of a system 
perched between order (such as slow, laminar fluid flow) and disorder [such as the turbulence of a 
fast-flowing fluid, (Shih et al., 2015)]. A critical system shows scale-free fluctuations that stretch 
from the smallest to the largest scale, and which may spontaneously jump between different 
spatiotemporal patterns. Despite their apparent random nature, the fluctuations in these systems are 
highly structured, obeying deep physical principles that show commonality from one system to the 
other (so-called universality). They can hence be subject to robust statistical analysis and modelling. 
 
Critical systems thus display the type of cross-scale effects and dynamic instabilities linking activity 
at different scales that is typical of brain functioning. An emerging literature suggests that brain 
function may be supported by critical neural dynamics, with original research that continues to 
flourish (Deco and Jirsa, 2012; Kelso et al., 1992; Priesemann et al., 2014; Scott et al., 2014) on the 
background of an existing body of reviews and syntheses (Beggs and Timme, 2012; Chialvo, 2010; 
Deco and Jirsa, 2012; He, 2013; Hesse and Gross, 2015; Kelso et al., 1992; Plenz and Thiagarajan, 
2007; Priesemann et al., 2014; Schuster et al., 2014; Scott et al., 2014; Shew and Plenz, 2013). The 
principles supporting the emergence of these patterns of activity are not yet fully understood but 
recent studies using neuroimaging techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
and electroencephalogram (EEG) (Deco et al., 2009; Linkenkaer-Hansen et al., 2001; Stam and de 
Bruin, 2004) have added to earlier work in slice preparations (Beggs and Plenz 2003). Computational 
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models also show that neural systems have maximum adaptability to accommodate incoming 
processing demands when they are close to a critical point (Friston et al., 2012b; Friston, 2000; Gollo 
and Breakspear, 2014; Kastner et al., 2015; Shew et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2012). Conversely, brain 
disorders, as diverse as epilepsy, encephalopathy, bipolar disorder and schizophrenia may correspond 
to excursions from such an optimal critical point. 
 
Despite the ubiquity of criticality in many branches of science, its application to neuroscience is 
relatively recent and unknown to many neuroscientists. When it is used, it is often invoked 
metaphorically; a practice which risks mixing distinct processes incorrectly into a rubric term. 
Research into criticality has much to offer neuroscientists, but needs to be used in accordance with its 
well-defined operational criteria. Accumulating evidence should also be viewed cautiously according 
to emerging pitfalls. Here, we first revisit the core notion of critical phenomenon and provide 
examples from the physical sciences. We then review the classic and recent studies of neuronal 
criticality. We finally consider emerging applications that advance new theories of healthy and 
maladaptive cognition using the innovative tools that criticality provides. 
 
2. Criticality in physical systems 
Criticality refers to the appearance of erratic fluctuations in a dynamical system that is close to losing 
dynamic stability. Because the nature of the instability can vary (as we review below), criticality is a 
broad umbrella term that subsumes several related phenomena but also excludes others. In this 
section, we present a brief pedagogical account of criticality. We first consider critical fluctuations 
that occur close to instability in systems consisting of only a few interacting components. This allows 
us to introduce core signatures of criticality; namely the emergence of scale-free temporal 
fluctuations, slowing down and multistability, defined below. We then consider criticality in complex 
systems composed of many interacting parts. These extra degrees of freedom allow for the occurrence 
of scale-free spatiotemporal fluctuations known as avalanches. Finally, we consider self-organized 
criticality - that is, the process by which criticality emerges without the need for external tuning of a 
control parameter. 
 
2.1. Criticality and bifurcations 
We first consider dynamical systems composed of only a few interacting components. Consider the 
classic example in which two species interact as predator and prey. When the interactions amongst the 
species are weak and alternative food sources are available, relatively simple models predict that the 
populations of both species reach stable equilibria, and the processes of consumption and 
reproduction occur at a steady rate (Berryman, 1992). However, if the interactions between the 
species increase (i.e. the predators rely more heavily upon the prey population), there reaches a 
critical point of interactivity above which the two populations begin to oscillate: When the predator 
population is relatively low, the number of prey animals grows through unbalanced reproduction. This 
then yields a ready food source for the surviving predators, whose population increases. However, as 
the increasing numbers of predators consume the available prey species, the numbers of the latter then 
decline, with a subsequent effect on the survival of the predators; the cycle then begins anew. This 
transition from steady state to cyclic behaviour due to strong interactions is called a bifurcation 
(Figure 1a). The strength of the interaction is called a control parameter and the point at which the 
bifurcation occurs is denoted the critical point. For three or more interacting species, further 
bifurcations to more complex dynamics can occur, leading from periodic to chaotic oscillations 
(smooth and deterministic but aperiodic oscillations) (Arneodo et al., 1980; Vano et al., 2006). 
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There are two crucial variations on this simple example. First physical processes, such as the predator-
prey example, inevitably occur in the presence of small but unceasing random fluctuations. This noise 
arises from a myriad of causes such as the probabilistic nature of individual predator-prey encounters 
as well as influences not explicitly modelled (diseases, fluctuating environmental conditions etc). 
When the interactions between predator and prey are weak, the equilibrium state is very stable and the 
presence of such random fluctuations only have a minor impact on the observed steady state 
populations. Likewise, if the interactions are strong, the cyclic oscillations in population numbers are 
also very stable: The amplitude of the oscillations is relatively stable and the noise is again effectively 
suppressed. More technically, away from the critical point, the system is said to be dynamically stable 
and the fluctuations are strongly damped, dropping off quickly (with an exponential decay rate). 
However, in the immediate vicinity of the critical point, the perturbations grow in magnitude, 
dominating the observations because the system is less stable (or weakly stable). That is, the variance 
of the observed fluctuations grows in magnitude. Moreover, the fluctuations decay slowly. To be 
precise, the decay of fluctuations in time changes from a fast (exponential, Figure 1b, inset) to a slow 
(power-law, Figure 1c, inset) process. Fluctuations with power-law correlations are scale-free 
because they do not have a characteristic time scale. Upon further increases in the control parameter, 
the fluctuations in the envelope of the oscillations quickly become stable (Figure 1d) and drop off 
quickly (exponentially, likewise the inset of Figure 1b). 
Hence near the critical point of a bifurcation, we encounter two central features of criticality: High 
amplitude scale-free fluctuations (Figure 1h) and slowing down (i.e., longer autocorrelation, Figure 
1i). These large, slow fluctuations are termed crackling noise after the sound they make if played 
audibly (Sethna et al., 2001).  
A second variation concerns the nature of the bifurcation itself. The predator-prey model exhibits a 
classic bifurcation, whereby a single critical point separates two distinct behaviours (steady state and 
oscillatory) in parameter space. This is denoted a supercritical bifurcation because the cyclic 
oscillations occur for values of the control parameter strictly greater than the critical point. However, 
subcritical bifurcations are also possible. In this setting, there exists a region where the steady state 
solutions and the periodic oscillations co-exist. Outside of this zone, the system behaves in the same 
way as the supercritical bifurcation (i.e., a single steady state or a periodic pattern of activity) (Figure 
1e). However, within this zone, the two dynamic states co-exist (Figure 1e and f). Noise can then 
push the system between these stable states, causing erratic jumps between low amplitude equilibrium 
and high amplitude oscillations (Figure 1f). This type of behaviour is called multistability (Freyer et 
al., 2011; Tognoli and Kelso, 2014). We consider examples of multistability in brain and behaviour 
below. 
 
Although critical fluctuations (near a supercritical bifurcation) and multistable fluctuations (due to a 
subcritical bifurcation) are mathematically related, they yield quite distinct statistics: The former 
(slow fluctuations) follow a scale-free power law distribution. This is the classic meaning of the term 
criticality. Noise-driven switches between two or more multistable attractors do not occur with a 
scale-free probability. In the setting of large additive noise, the transitions are akin to a Poisson 
process and thus follow an exponential distribution. With smaller, state-dependent noise, the system 
tends to get trapped near each state, with the transitions then following a heavier tailed stretched 
exponential distribution (Freyer et al., 2011; Freyer et al., 2012). Either way, such multistable 
switching does not possess scale-free (power law) properties and does not correspond to the classic 
notion of criticality.  
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Figure 1: Criticality in a low dimensional system consisting of a few interacting components. (a) Super-critical 
bifurcation diagram, depicting the amplitude of a system’s state variable (y-axis) as a function of a control 
parameter (such as the strength of interactions, x-axis). When the control parameter is increased, the activity 
of the system switches from a damped equilibrium point (red circle) to oscillatory behaviour (yellow circle). 
The point of change is known as the critical point (blue circle). (b) In the presence of noise, the damped system 
(red circle) exhibits low amplitude, rapid fluctuations. The duration of these follows an exponential probability 
distribution (red dots, inset). (c) At the critical point, the fluctuations have high variance and rise and fall 
slowly, following a power law distribution, corresponding to a linear relationship between their duration and 
their likelihood in double logarithmic coordinates (inset). In addition, the slope of this relation is described by a 
critical exponent of α = −3/2. (d) Beyond the critical point, the system exhibits sustained oscillations. The 
fluctuations in the amplitude envelope of the oscillations are fast and small. (e) Sub-critical bifurcation 
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diagram, with a zone of co-existence (or “bistability”) between the fixed point and oscillatory behaviours. In 
this case, system noise not only drives fluctuations around each attractor, but can also drive sudden and 
erratic jumps between the two dynamic states as depicted by the double headed arrow. (f) Example bistable 
time series. (g) Multistable bifurcation diagram as reproduced from Freeman (Freeman, 1987), proposed as a 
model for perceptual activity in the olfactory system. In this case, the number and complexity of the attractors 
is larger, however, the underlying principle is the same. Critical slowing down corresponds to a sharp increase 
in the coefficient of variation of the mean amplitude across 200 trials (h) and the auto-correlation function (i) 
at the critical point. 
2.2. Criticality and phase transitions  
We have thus far considered relatively simple systems composed of only a few components, or where 
the elements of the system are lumped into a small number of variables (such as all predators and all 
prey species each being considered a single entity). We now move to studying critical systems 
composed of many interacting components such as magnetic spins in iron (Stanley, 1987), grains of 
sand falling onto a pile (Bak et al., 1988), or neurons (Plenz and Thiagarajan, 2007). On top of the 
example considered in Figure 1, these examples introduce a spatial dimension through which the 
components of the system interact.  
 
The emergence of a magnetic field in a ferromagnetic material (such as iron) cooled below a critical 
temperature (Tc) is a classic example of a phase transition. Such materials have permanent magnetic 
moments (dipoles) due to the spin of unpaired electrons in atomic or molecular electron orbits. These 
dipoles interact through the mutual effects of the local fields that they impart on their immediate 
neighbours (Figure 2a), causing neighbouring dipoles to align and form local domains of coherent 
fields. These effects partially counter the influence of stochastic thermal and quantum effects that 
cause random flips in the direction of the dipoles. At temperatures greater than Tc, stochastic flips 
disrupt the formation of larger domains and, in the absence of an external field, the material will not 
possess a macroscopic magnetic field. Slow cooling of the material allows domains of increasing size 
to form, although domains at the very largest scales continue to disappear into the background noise. 
However, when the material is cooled to a critical point (the Curie temperature), the smaller domains 
coalesce into increasingly larger ones until they approach the size of the entire system. The 
coalescence of small domains into those of successively larger size is called an avalanche (Figure 
2a). At the Curie temperature, avalanches have no characteristic size and thus may intermittently 
sweep through the entire system. These avalanches can be measured empirically using a large, 
external pick-up device (Cote and Meisel, 1991; McClure Jr and Schroder, 1976; Meisel and Cote, 
1992; Perković et al., 1995). Below the critical temperature, the mutual interactions amongst the spins 
align into domains that encompass nearly every dipole; at this point, the material shows a coherent 
ferromagnetic field (despite ongoing disorder at the atomic scales). The transition through the critical 
point in such a high dimensional system is called a phase transition. 
 
A phase transition in iron cooled below its Curie temperature is a classic example of how simple 
internal interactions can overcome disorder and yield, through a critical point, a macroscopic field. 
The imposition of an external field of sufficient strength on a ferromagnet below the critical point can 
cause the field to suddenly switch directions to align with the applied field (Vojta et al., 2013): Here, 
in contrast, the macroscopic order is imposed externally. 
 
There are many similarities between bifurcations and phase transition, including the presence of 
super- and subcritical varieties (Figure 2b): These are called continuous and discontinuous or 
(second- and first-order) phase transitions in this context (Kim et al., 1997). The transition from a 
para- to a ferromagnet due to cooling, outlined above, is an example of a continuous phase transition: 
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The sudden switching of that field due to an external field is a discontinuous one, as is water turning 
into vapour in the presence of heat (Stanley 1987). When the phase transition is discontinuous, then 
noise-driven multistability may also occur: Noise can induce switches between ordered and random 
states (Figure 2b). Alternatively, as in the case of the (discontinuous) phase transition between water 
and steam, there can arise complex mixtures of both. Just as in the case of a bifurcation, however, 
multistability arising due to a discontinuous phase transition does not exhibit the scale-free, ‘critical 
phenomena’ discussed above. Critical, power law scaling in the spatial and temporal domains is 
unique to a continuous phase transition. 
 
Whilst we here focused upon the canonical example of spins in a weak external field, the basic 
ingredients (local interactions, noise, a large number of subsystems, an external influence that brings 
weak coherence) occur widely and, as a result, phase transitions are ubiquitously observed in nature 
(Stanley, 1987). 
 
The temporal behaviour of a spatially-extended system near a phase transition mirrors the behaviour 
of two interacting elements near a bifurcation – namely slow, high amplitude fluctuations. These 
fluctuations, however, additionally exhibit complex spatiotemporal processes – avalanches – that also 
show scale-free statistical properties. Away from the critical point, the likelihood of an avalanche 
drops off quickly (exponentially) with size (the number of elements involved). In the classical 
example of magnetism, the domains of coherent spins are very small at high temperatures. If the 
temperature is tuned towards the critical point (Tc), the coherent domains sporadically increase in size 
and the ensuing distribution of avalanche sizes decays slowly as a function of spatial scale. The size 
of such domains measured over time converges toward a scale-free (power law) effect (Figure 2c). If 
the temperature is further reduced, large and stable coherent domains appear corresponding to the 
emergence of an internal magnetic field. 
 
The correlation length is a useful concept in this setting. In the disordered phase of the system (i.e. for 
weak external fields) only adjacent spins are correlated– distant spins are completely uncorrelated. As 
larger avalanches begin to appear at low temperature, electron spins become correlated across the 
scale of the corresponding coherent domains. The correlation length – the spatial scale at which pairs 
of electrons are at least weakly correlated –increases. At the phase transition, as the size of the 
coherent domains approaches that of the system, the correlation length diverges upwards. As a result, 
external perturbations applied to any part of the system may lead to a change in the state of the whole 
system. Put alternatively the system has maximum dynamic range because any small perturbation has 
a chance of changing the electron spins of such a critical paramagnetic system. 
 
We have focused upon phase transitions in spatially extended (embedded) systems, such as magnets 
and water which are dominated by interactions or collisions between the neighbouring elements of the 
system. However, the description of avalanches in large N systems does not inevitably refer to space. 
A branching process is a simple model of a phase transition that describes how activated elements 
may either decay (to inactive) or activate other elements with the progression of time (De Carvalho 
and Prado, 2000). Criticality occurs when the decay and activation rates are in equal ratio. This 
canonical model of a phase transition, which has been used to study criticality in neural systems [e.g. 
(Beggs and Plenz, 2003)], does not require a spatial dimension; metrics such as the correlation length 
do not make sense in these models. Although such abstract models may not take space into account, 
complex multi-unit physical systems such as the brain must be embedded in space, and the 
interactions between the elements are very often constrained by their spatial proximity (Roberts et al., 
2016).  
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Figure 2: Phase transitions and avalanches in spatially extended systems. (a) Continuous (or second order) 
phase transition. The disordered (random) phase (red) shows lack of spatial order (red square) with randomly 
oriented spins in a typical physical system such as a ferromagnet in a weak external field. The ordered phase 
(yellow) shows large domains of co-aligned spins. At the critical point (blue), avalanches of complex partially-
ordered domains rise and dissolve across all scales (blue square), leading to a power law size distribution. (b) 
Phase transitions can also be discontinuous (also called first order). As with a sub-critical bifurcation, system 
noise then causes erratic switching between the disordered and ordered phases (double headed arrow). (c) 
Cumulative probability distribution of the relationship between the size and likelihood of avalanches at 
criticality. A scale-free processes yields a linear scaling relationship in double logarithmic coordinates (a power 
law) with a critical exponent of α = −3/2. Note the slight exponential truncation at the right hand side, due to 
finite size effects. 
 
As we have seen, phase transitions can be considered a natural extension of the notion of a bifurcation 
from systems with few components, to those with many. The underlying mathematics is very similar 
Criticality in the brain   Cocchi et al. 11 
 
 11 
(in fact, the so-called Landau equation, used to model generic phase transitions, is mathematically 
identical to the Normal form equation used to describe bifurcations). Historically, however, the two 
phenomena have been studied in different fields - bifurcations by applied mathematicians, whereas 
phase transitions were classically the domain of physicists. This legacy has led to a difference in the 
use of the central terms, sub- and super-criticality: In mathematics, “sub-“ and “super-critical” qualify 
bifurcations, denoting distinct instabilities that differ in their underlying mathematical nature (Figure 
1a and 1e) and, as a result, the behaviour they yield. In physics, these terms are used to describe the 
phases of the system. “Subcritical” phase is used to denote the stable, absorbing state below a phase 
transition (Figure 1a, red dot and Figure 1b). The term “supercritical” is used to denote the ordered 
state above the transition, whereby the amplitude of the order parameter (y-axis) is typically non-zero 
(Figure 1a, yellow dot and Figure 1d). It is unlikely that an attempted synthesis of those terms here 
would pervade both fields. For the remainder of this paper, we use the terms “sub-” versus “super-
critical bifurcation” to denote the type of instability, and “sub-” versus “super-critical state”, 
“activity” or “phase” to denote where a particular system lies with respects to the phase transition. In 
general, since the interpretation is largely dependent on the audience, caution is required when 
interpreting or using those terms more broadly. 
 
Phase transitions and criticality have been documented in a very broad range of physical systems over 
many decades (Kosterlitz and Thouless, 1973; Yang and Lee, 1952) and their study remains one of 
the most active areas of research in branches of physics such as statistical mechanics (Papanikolaou et 
al., 2011; Sethna et al., 2001; Zapperi et al., 2005). The signatures of criticality have been 
documented in systems as diverse as flocking birds (Cavagna et al., 2010), earthquakes (Burridge and 
Knopoff, 1967; Carlson and Langer, 1989; Rice and Ruina, 1983); solar flares (Lu et al., 1993), 
armed conflict (Roberts and Turcotte, 1998), traffic jams (Nagel and Herrmann, 1993), and capital 
wealth (Roberts and Turcotte, 1998) – even crumpled paper [(Houle and Sethna, 1996; Kramer and 
Lobkovsky, 1996); for review see (Roberts and Turcotte, 1998)].  
 
We turn to evidence for criticality in the brain in Section 3 after considering its underlying appeal. But 
before moving, it is instructive to contextualize the importance of criticality as a theoretical 
framework and how it may come about in many distinct systems.  
2.3. The conceptual appeal of criticality 
 Criticality derives its basic appeal from a number of considerations. First, it speaks to the presence of 
a relatively simple underlying process - the response of a weakly stable system to stochastic 
perturbations - arising in very different settings. The processes that drive the system close to 
instability can be diverse – a build-up of fuel; varying temperature; a driving external magnetic field; 
strong interactions between species – but the collective response in generating slow, multiscale 
fluctuations is shared. Likewise, the many specific details of the systems differ markedly (e.g., 
magnetic spins, moving tectonic plates, neurons) but can be unified by their core dynamic nature - 
possessing interactions among their components that erratically amplify and damp microscopic 
perturbations. This notion of “universality” is very appealing to scientists who seek unifying 
principles across diverse systems. That is, the appearance of power-law and invariant scaling in 
markedly different systems suggests the importance of processes that transcend their particular 
incarnation. Of note, the characteristic exponent in the power-law scaling that describe the critical 
fluctuations in many of these systems typically converges to a value of −3/2. Theoretical 
considerations support the emergence of this value in systems at the cusp of a phase transition 
(Zapperi et al., 1995). Thus, basic theoretical arguments unify diverse phenomena – this is the essence 
of universality (Stanley, 1999). 
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Computational considerations also underlie the appeal of criticality. Here we review the 
computational aspects of criticality in physical systems. In Section 3.3, we focus on the computational 
advantages of criticality in the brain. The earliest demonstrations of the computational advantages of 
the critical state were done in a very simple and idealized system called cellular automata (CA), 
whose dynamics evolve discretely in space and time according to very simple interaction rules 
(Langton, 1990). By changing an underlying interaction parameter, CA can be tuned to converge very 
quickly to simple periodic (spatiotemporal) structures, or to unstructured, chaotic processes. In 
between these scenarios – at the so-called “edge of chaos” – CA exhibit lengthy mixtures of ordered 
and disorganized structures. Theoretical arguments show that the computational complexity of CA 
diverge in this regime. That is, if one considers the information content of the system at each time 
point, the number of iterations before CA converge onto a stable solution becomes very long for this 
in-between state (although see (Mitchell et al., 1993) for an opposing position). Depending upon 
one’s viewpoint, the simplicity of CA is either conceptually appealing (since complexity arises from 
very simple laws) or distracting, because the physical meaning of CA is unclear. However, the 
implications of the proposal – complexity from simplicity - are tantalising, underlying the influence of 
CA. Its catch-phrase “edge of chaos” became a very well-known way to refer to the computational 
advantages offered by the critical state. Further research has shown that several other physical and 
biological systems also have optimal computational properties at criticality (Crutchfield and Young, 
1988; Kauffman and Johnsen, 1991; Mora and Bialek, 2011; Nykter et al., 2008).  
 
The appeal of criticality also finds support from thermodynamic perspectives. In a stable, subcritical 
system, random fluctuations arising from thermal energy and other sources of entropy are confined to 
the microscopic scale, like a giant TV screen showing pixel-wise static. While these microscopic 
fluctuations have high entropy, meso- and macroscopic scales are damped and are hence in a 
featureless, low entropy state. Above the critical point, the macroscopic scale of the system can show 
interesting features, such as periodic structures and oscillations. However, fluctuations at finer scales 
are slaved to these large-scale features and thus do not express the potential entropy arising from the 
smallest microscopic scales. In these two states – sub- and super-critical, respectively, high entropy 
can be thought of as being trapped at one particular scale and unavailable at other scales. At the 
critical state, microscopic fluctuations erratically disseminate to larger scales through avalanches and 
crackles. These fluctuations introduce packets of disorder which accordingly increase the information 
content of the system across all scales. That is, while criticality increases correlations – and thus 
decreases entropy – at the smallest scale, it “transports” random fluctuations across scales increasing 
the total complexity of the system (Tononi et al., 1994).  
2.4. Self-organised criticality  
Why is it that so many systems found in nature appear to be perched at a critical point? In theory the 
critical point becomes confined to a very small range of values as the size of the system increases (see 
Figure 1h). For an experimental system such as the paramagnetic material discussed above, the 
external field can be carefully (manually) tuned until crackling noise and avalanches appear. 
However, for other systems, such as earthquakes, forest fires and flocking birds the fingerprints of 
criticality seem to arise internally without the need for careful tuning by an external observer. 
 
The answer to this apparent dilemma is contained in the notion of self-organised criticality (SOC), a 
process whereby a complex system is driven toward its critical point across a very wide set of starting 
points and parameter values. The classic example of SOC was provided in the behaviour of sand-pile 
avalanches by the work of Per Bak (Bak, 1990; Bak et al., 1987, 1988). In essence, the slow addition 
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of sand to the apex of a sand-pile leads to the gradual increase in the slope of its sides. At a critical 
slope, scale-free avalanches of falling sand begin to occur. The slope angle decreases with each 
avalanche as (gravitational) energy is released from the system, then increases again as new sand is 
added. The slope does not need to be tuned by the experimentalist but naturally emerges from the 
interplay of the interactions between the adjacent grains of sand, the external (gravitational) force and 
the slow addition of sand.  
 
Modelling SOC in complex systems with weak local interactions and noise is a very active field 
(Marković and Gros, 2014).  Two mechanisms appear sufficient for the appearance of SOC – firstly 
the dissipation of energy and secondly some form of “memory” in the system. For example, a large 
forest fire burns through a build-up of timber fuel: Energy has dissipated from the system and a period 
of time must now pass until there is sufficient new fuel for fire of any appreciable magnitude. 
Likewise, a large avalanche of sand in a slowly building sand pile changes the gradient of the pile. 
Time and small avalanches must then accrue before the slope of the pile is sufficiently steep to trigger 
another large avalanche. Again in seismology, tension from tectonic plates is released following a 
large earthquake and its aftershocks, such that subsequent large earthquakes are unlikely to follow 
immediately. Each of these systems is characterized by the build-up and subsequent dissipation of 
energy or resources, whose release is ‘remembered’ by the system until sufficient resources have 
recovered. We will encounter similar concepts when we discuss mechanisms of SOC in neuronal 
systems (Section 3.3). 
 
3. Criticality in the brain 
The role of criticality and multistability in neurophysiological systems of the brain was first 
articulated over 3 decades ago by Walter Freeman following detailed empirical analyses and 
computational models of the rabbit olfactory bulb (Figure 1g). In particular, Freeman proposed that 
the process of inhalation and exhalation acted, via modulation of the gain of excitatory neurons, to 
sweep the activity of the olfactory bulb through a sub-critical bifurcation and hence through a zone of 
multistability (Freeman, 1987; Freeman, 1991). Sensory inputs, arising from contact of inhaled 
molecules with membrane receptors of olfactory neurons, then act to selectively perturb the system 
onto one of several competing dynamic patterns. This dynamic pattern was proposed to encode the 
olfactory input – the percept - until it destabilized during exhalation as the system passed again into 
the zone where only the stable equilibrium solution exists. We now survey more recent examples of 
criticality and multistability in neuronal systems that build upon the foresights contained in Freeman’s 
prescient papers. 
3.1. Rhythmic fluctuations, bifurcations and slowing down 
The mechanisms underlying motor coordination have been an intriguing area for the application of 
dynamic systems theory (Bressler and Kelso, 2001; Kelso and Clark, 1982). One fruitful candidate 
has been the study of rhythmic finger tapping. At slow frequencies, humans are able to tap in either of 
two stable modes: syncopation and anti-syncopation. However, at high frequencies, the anti-
syncopation mode becomes unstable and only the in-phase syncopation pattern is expressed (Kelso et 
al., 1986). The hallmarks of criticality are seen just prior to this transition, namely slowing, high 
amplitude movement fluctuations (Kelso, 1984, 2014). To explain this, Haken, Kelso and Bunz used a 
sub-critical bifurcation in a simple model of motor coordination between the left and right motor 
cortices (Haken et al., 1985). The transition from a bimodal to unimodal pattern of behaviour 
occurred at the critical value of the movement frequency. This framework has also been employed to 
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explain the transition between movement patterns induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) (Kelso, 2014). 
 
More recent work on criticality has focused on the temporal fluctuations observed in the major 
rhythms of EEG and MEG data. Employing an analysis called detrended fluctuation analysis (DFA), 
Linkenkaer-Hauser and colleagues reported that the fluctuating amplitudes of the two dominant 
oscillations of the human brain – the alpha and beta rhythms – exhibited scale-free temporal statistics 
(Linkenkaer-Hansen et al., 2001). Fluctuating levels of synchrony between pairs of electrodes have 
also been reported to show scale-free statistics (Stam and de Bruin, 2004). Likewise, the power 
spectrum of human neocortical activity acquired from invasive ECoG data shows scale-free temporal 
behaviour across a very broad range of frequencies (Miller et al., 2009). These frequencies also show 
multi-scale nesting – that is, the amplitude of high frequencies is coupled to the phase of lower 
frequencies; a pattern that is recursively repeated from very slow to very high frequencies (He et al., 
2010). Computational models of large-scale neuronal activity – neural field models – suggest that the 
critical temporal statistics in these electrocortical recordings may arise from a subcritical bifurcation 
of activity in corticothalamic loops (Freyer et al., 2009; Freyer et al., 2011). Such modelling proposes 
that noise-driven switching between a low amplitude steady state and high amplitude oscillations 
(Figure 1) yields the empirically observed critical fluctuations seen at rest (Freyer et al., 2012).  
3.2. Neuronal avalanches and phase transitions 
In 2003, Beggs and Plenz found evidence of critical behaviour in the erratic spontaneous activity 
measured in in vitro neuronal cultures (Beggs and Plenz, 2003). They documented the two salient 
features of criticality in a spatially extended critical system, namely power-law scaling in time (the 
duration of bursts of activity) and space (the number of electrodes spanned by each burst). Together 
with the earlier work of Freeman, this finding ushered in criticality as a term of clear relevance to 
complex neuronal multi-scale phenomenon. 
 
Since these initial reports of avalanches in in vitro slice preparations by Beggs and Plenz, research 
into critical avalanche-like activity in spatiotemporal neural recordings has proceeded at great pace 
(Plenz and Thiagarajan, 2007; Schuster et al., 2014; Shew, 2015). Observations of scale-free 
spatiotemporal fluctuations in spontaneous, physiological data have progressed from in vitro slice 
preparations (Beggs and Plenz, 2003), to in vivo recordings from superficial layers of cortex (Gautam 
et al., 2015; Gireesh and Plenz, 2008) to awake non-human primates (Petermann et al., 2009) [for 
review, see Shew and Plenz (2013)]. Scale-free avalanches have been reported in human whole brain 
magnetoencephalographic (MEG) data (Shriki et al., 2013), and complex, scale-free spatial 
dependences, consistent with avalanches, have been described in whole brain functional neuroimaging 
(fMRI) data (Tagliazucchi et al., 2012). Notably, these recordings cross broad scales of aperture from 
multi-unit recordings to macroscopic field potentials and whole brain functional neuroimaging data.  
 
There is a growing focus in the imaging community on spontaneous (resting-state) fMRI data and the 
reproducible structures these reveal in health (Damoiseaux et al., 2006; Zalesky et al., 2014) and 
disease (Fornito et al., 2015). Whereas the number of channels in neurophysiological recordings, such 
as MEG, has a modest upper bound (of several hundred), the high spatial resolution of fMRI yields 
thousands of voxels (~100,000 voxels). These data hence contain the breadth of spatial scales required 
to interrogate whether the spatial fluctuations are scale-free (Eguiluz et al., 2005) and thus whether 
critical dynamics underlie the dynamic patterns seen at rest (Chialvo, 2012). Recent evidence from 
both empirical (Tagliazucchi et al., 2012) and computational (Deco and Jirsa, 2012) analyses points in 
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favour of this proposal. Among the most intriguing findings are the recapitulation of the classic 
resting-state networks (Yeo et al., 2011) by models of critical dynamics arising from primate (Honey 
et al., 2007) and human (Haimovici et al., 2013) structural connectomes. Analysis of the temporal 
statistics of resting-state fMRI and EEG also suggests that long-range, scale-free correlations may 
indeed lie at the very heart of the slow fluctuations that are observed in these data (Van de Ville et al., 
2010).  
 
This emerging view is schematically summarized in Figure 3. In the sub-critical zone, bursts of 
cortical activity are sporadic uncoordinated (red box). Above the critical value, cortical activity is 
coupled too tightly and conversely, inadequately segregated (yellow box). Resting-state networks 
function at the critical value, where switching between network states occurs due to weak dynamic 
instabilities (light blue box).  
 
 
Figure 3: Proposed role of criticality in large-scale, resting-state brain dynamics. In the sub-critical region, 
individual brain regions are effectively uncoupled, showing a lack of integration (red square). Conversely, in 
the super-critical region, integration is too great and there is a lack of segregation (yellow). Near the critical 
point, an emerging body of work in EEG, MEG and fMRI suggests that brain systems show a dynamic balance of 
integration and segregation (blue square), fluctuating among the various resting-state networks (and EEG 
rhythms). Cognitive function requires a slight incursion away from the critical regime leading to a stabilization 
of one particular network, consistent with the earlier proposals of Freeman. 
 
There is now a very well established relationship between resting state brain networks and the 
underlying structural connectome from which they arise (Honey et al., 2007). Criticality arising in 
simple systems does not require a complex spatial substrate: Rather as we have reviewed above, its 
hallmark is the emergence of complex spatiotemporal processes from simple, local interactions. 
However, complex networks may allow critical-like behaviour to occur in a region of parameter space 
instead of a single point (Moretti and Muñoz, 2013). Moreover, in the primate brain, structural-
functional correlations argue for the existence of a relationship between critical dynamics and the 
relatively static underlying structural connectome. The nature of this relationship between critical 
states in resting-state fMRI data and the connectome is not well understood. Highly interconnected 
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cortical hubs, and brain regions comprising the so-called default-mode network may play a prominent 
role in maintaining resting-state network dynamics (Gollo et al., 2015; Leech et al., 2012; Vasa et al., 
2015) and in facilitating the efficient spread of avalanche events through macroscopic brain networks 
(Misic et al., 2015). The constellation of densely connected hub regions – the rich club – appear to 
support a slow, stable dynamic “core” whereas peripheral sensory regions introduce (rapid) stimuli-
related variability in the system (Bassett et al., 2013; Gollo et al., 2015; Hasson et al., 2015). Such a 
core-periphery organization of brain network dynamics speaks to a hierarchy of time-scale 
fluctuations, in which hub regions integrate and regulate the network dynamics largely operating at 
slow frequencies (Cocchi et al., 2016; Gollo et al., 2017; Gollo et al., 2015; Hasson et al., 2008; 
Honey et al., 2012; Murray et al., 2014). Hub regions within the default-mode brain network may 
represent a structural signature of near-critical behaviour. Regions comprising this network exhibit 
coordinated activity in the resting-state when the coherence between nodes of other “task-positive” 
networks is generally suppressed (Cocchi et al., 2013; Fox et al., 2005; Hearne et al., 2015).  
 
These observations suggest mechanisms through which critical dynamics may adapt to, and reshape 
the complex nervous systems in which they occur, particularly the relationship between synaptic 
processes, functional connectivity and network topology (Rubinov et al., 2009; Zhigalov et al., 2017). 
3.3. Computational aspects of neuronal criticality 
The pioneering work of Freeman (on bifurcations and multistability), and Beggs and Plenz (on critical 
avalanches) provided proof-of-principles that the science of criticality could be used to inform our 
understanding of complex patterns of activity in the brain and, by extension, behaviour. Research in 
these areas has accelerated dramatically and now yields a stream of important discoveries spanning 
from the neuronal (Gal and Marom, 2013; Gollo et al., 2013) to the whole-brain scale (Kitzbichler et 
al., 2009).  
 
As reviewed above, the study of criticality in physical systems using simple models suggested that 
systems at the critical state are endowed with optimal computational properties. Such advantages have 
recently been demonstrated in models and empirical recordings of critical neuronal systems [for 
review, see (Beggs, 2007; Shew and Plenz, 2013)]. Perhaps most crucially, optimal dynamic range – 
the sensitivity of a neuronal system to respond to, and amplify, inputs across a broad spectrum of 
intensities – was shown to be maximized in models of neuronal systems tuned to a critical state 
(Kinouchi and Copelli, 2006; Larremore et al., 2011). In slice cultures grown on the surface of 
multielectrode arrays, Shew and colleagues later provided empirical evidence for this proposal, 
showing that the maximum dynamic range to electrical perturbation was indeed maximized when the 
cultures were pharmacologically manipulated to be close to criticality (Shew et al., 2009). Recent 
electrophysiological recordings from the anaesthetized rat provided the first in vivo evidence that 
dynamic range in perceptual systems is maximized when background activity is at the critical point 
(Gautam et al., 2015).  
 
Another example of the computational advantages of criticality arises from simplified neuronal 
models which predict high fidelity and optimal information transmission (maximum mutual 
information between sender and receiver) at criticality (Beggs and Plenz, 2003; Greenfield and Lecar, 
2001): This prediction was also later observed in vitro (Shew et al., 2011) and more recently in 
awake, behaving mice (Fagerholm et al., 2016).  
 
Research in this field has also suggested that information storage and capacity – the ability of a 
system to encode a broad repertoire of complex states from which information can be decoded 
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(Gatlin, 1972)– may be optimized at criticality. Again, this notion has been captured in simple neural 
models (Bertschinger and Natschläger, 2004; Haldeman and Beggs, 2005; Yang et al., 2017) and also 
demonstrated in empirical recordings, including those arising in unperturbed (resting state) recordings 
(Breakspear, 2001; Deco and Jirsa, 2012) as well as through careful pharmacological manipulations of 
in vivo neurophysiological recordings (Stewart and Plenz, 2006). Selective enhancement of weak (but 
not strong) stimuli also occurs near a phase transition (Copelli, 2014). It is also interesting to note that 
optimal computational properties can arise at both continuous and discontinuous phase transitions 
(Gollo et al., 2012). 
 
A compelling argument for the advantage provided by the critical state derives from the analysis of 
psychophysics experiments, which quantify the relationship between physical stimuli and perceptual 
responses. Psychophysics relations may represent the earliest documented evidence of critical 
dynamics in the nervous system (Kello et al., 2010). Across a variety of sensory modalities, these 
experiments showed power-law relations, known as Steven’s laws, in which the perceived 
psychophysical or neuronal response F is given by: 𝐹(𝑆) ∝ 𝑆𝑚, where S is the stimulus level and m is 
the Stevens exponent (Stevens, 1975). To account for the saturation of the response that occurs for 
extreme stimuli, the psychophysics response is modelled by a sigmoid Hill function: 𝐹(𝑆) ∝
𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑆
𝑚 (𝑆𝑚 + 𝑆0
𝑚)⁄ , where Fmax corresponds to the saturated response, and 𝑆0
  the input level for 
half-maximum response. Importantly, this function also retains the power-law regime governed by the 
exponent m. This power-law behaviour has a key putative function: It allows animals to distinguish 
stimulus intensity varying across many orders of magnitude. As such, the power-law regime can 
compress decades of stimulus variation S into a single decade of response F. A standard means to 
measure this coding performance is called the dynamic range. The larger the dynamic range, the 
better the ability to detect changes in stimuli. Modelling the neuronal behaviour at the sensory 
periphery, Kinouchi and Copelli showed that a large dynamic range emerges from the collective 
response of a network of many interacting units, and, more importantly, the dynamic range is optimal 
when the network is at the critical state (Kinouchi and Copelli, 2006). This work explains the long-
lasting psychophysical scaling relations (Steven’s law), and provides a clear example in which a 
meaningful biological feature is optimised at criticality. Similar to earlier proposals, the work of 
Kinouchi and Copelli was also based on a fairly simple model of neuronal activity. Crucially, 
however, the model generated a prediction that was subsequently verified experimentally (Shew et al., 
2009).  
 
The explanation of the power-law regime of psychophysics laws in terms of the optimal sensitivity of 
critical states was an important contribution. However, as usual in analytic approaches, some 
simplifications were made, leading to at least two conundrums. The first challenge refers to the 
important trade-off between sensitivity and specificity. The finding that optimal signal coding occurs 
at criticality implies maximum sensitivity. Yet, the specificity of this state is compromised because of 
increased levels of fluctuation. As illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, criticality corresponds to the state 
with the largest macroscopic fluctuations. This is why the critical state allows for the amplification of 
stimuli of small intensity, which enhances the ability to distinguish the stimulus intensity varying over 
orders of magnitude (i.e., large sensitivity). However, the very same effect is also a limitation because 
the high fluctuations of criticality reduce the specificity of the system. The issue is whether the 
improved sensitivity remains beneficial to the system when the reduction in specificity is also taken 
into account. Fortunately, a solution for the sensitivity-specificity conflict exists in the presence of 
diversity amongst components of the system. Heterogeneous excitable systems exhibit recruitment 
properties in which units are recruited following their order of excitability (Gollo et al., 2016). 
Therefore, a state of optimal sensitivity has units forming a subpopulation in a critical regime as well 
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as subpopulations operating in a non-critical state with improved reliability. Hence, optimised systems 
represent the coexistence of subpopulations of reliable units and poor sensitivity (poised away from 
their critical state) with a subpopulation of unreliable units and great sensitivity (typical of the critical 
state). In other words, optimal perceptual performance may rely on the contribution of critical and 
non-critical units (Gollo, 2017).  
 
The second challenge emerging from the explanation of the power-law regime of psychophysics laws 
derives from to the fact that the critical state for optimal psychophysical response of Kinouchi and 
Copelli separates an active state from an inactive state (Kinouchi and Copelli, 2006). The issue here is 
that the inactive state corresponds to an absorbing state in which the system cannot escape unless 
external stimuli are provided. Hence, if the system falls into this state, it will get trapped there. 
Critical systems typically do fall into this state because of their enhanced fluctuations. If the system 
corresponds to the brain or a part of the nervous system, such an inactive state would be expected to 
occur rather frequently. However, such silent states are not observed in vivo. The solution to this issue 
also derives from the incorporation of an essential, but often overlooked, ingredient: inhibition. 
Larremore and colleagues showed that ceaseless activity and critical avalanches coexist when a 
substantial fraction of the units are inhibitory (Larremore et al., 2014). Hence, evidence is gradually 
accumulating for the previously idealised proposal that biological systems can exploit special features 
of the critical state. Meanwhile, models supporting this proposal are incrementally incorporating 
greater physiological detail. 
 
Research in the auditory system has highlighted the advantages conferred by active responses of hair 
bundles poised in a critical state (Camalet et al., 2000; Eguíluz et al., 2000). In response to sound-
wave input, hair bundles oscillate and their dynamics vary from a steady to an oscillatory regime. 
Each bundle is tuned to a particular natural frequency and adjacent cells respond maximally to 
successive pitches, giving rise to a tonotopic map in the cochlea (Romani et al., 1982). Crucially, 
computational modelling suggests that active and nonlinear hair bundles that operate near a Hopf 
bifurcation optimise the cochlea's performance and enhance the main features of auditory coding, 
such as, amplification, frequency selectivity and compressive nonlinearity (Hudspeth, 2008; 
Maoiléidigh et al., 2012).  
3.4. Self-organised neuronal criticality 
A growing body of empirical work has thus asserted the presence of scale-free statistics across a 
diversity of in vitro and in vivo neural recordings, while computational models have highlighted its 
computational advantages. Of note, the critical activity observed by Beggs and Plenz (2003) was 
stable for many hours and did not require careful tuning of the parameters of their culture (i.e. the pH, 
temperature, etc). Simple models of criticality classically rely upon fine-tuning of system parameters 
to a critical value (Levina et al., 2014). What is the basis for a robustness that apparently eschews the 
need for such a balancing act? As discussed above (Section 2.4), analyses of critical systems in 
physical systems reconcile this paradox by recourse to self-organised criticality (SOC). In brief, SOC 
arises when the interactions amongst system components are imbued with some form of plasticity, 
such as when system energy accumulates and is then dissipated by a large-scale avalanche. During 
periods of quiescence, energy slowly accumulates until it tips the system into (or above) criticality. 
The consequent energy dissipation briefly renders the system sub-critical until further energy 
accumulates. There is thus a time scale separation between the fast system dynamics and the slow 
build up and dissipation of energy. 
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Several models of criticality in the brain incorporate such slow processes (Marković and Gros, 2014). 
A considerable body of research has focused upon the role of various forms of synaptic plasticity, 
including simple activity-dependent up- and down-regulation (de Arcangelis, 2008), activity-
dependent synaptic plasticity (de Arcangelis et al., 2006), synaptic potentiation (Stepp et al., 2015), 
short-term synaptic depression through depletion of synaptic vesicles (Bonachela et al., 2010; Levina 
et al., 2014; Mihalas et al., 2014; Millman et al., 2010), Hebbian (Van Kessenich et al., 2016) and 
anti-Hebbian synaptic plasticity (Cowan et al., 2014; Magnasco et al., 2009), and spike-time 
dependent plasticity (de Andrade Costa et al., 2015; Rubinov et al., 2011). As with physical systems, 
the (relatively) slow synaptic plasticity serves to broaden the critical point to a broad, stable region. 
Other neurobiological processes have also been proposed, including balanced excitation-inhibition 
and network topology (Rubinov et al., 2011) and dynamic neuronal gain (Brochini et al., 2016). More 
recently, the role of energy build-up and dissipation in physical systems has been recast in critical 
neural systems as the replenishment and depletion of intracellular metabolic resources including 
Adenosine Triphosphate (ATP); (Roberts et al., 2014b; Stramaglia et al., 2015; Virkar et al., 2016). 
 
4. Challenges and pitfalls of the criticality hypothesis 
Despite this recent emergence of criticality research in neuroscience, lessons learned in other branches 
of science raise important pitfalls and caveats. First, inferring the presence of scale-free statistics in 
neuroscience data has classically rested upon fitting a power-law (or Pareto) regression to the 
probability distribution of the size of the temporal or spatial fluctuations (Figure 1 and Figure 2). The 
statistical principles underlying this exercise were critiqued in a highly influential survey by Clauset 
and colleagues (Clauset et al., 2009). While a linear regression in double logarithmic coordinates can 
yield a fit that looks impressive, such a process is insensitive to the distribution of data at the right-
hand tail of the distribution – the very region where the presence of a heavy-tailed power law needs to 
be rigorously tested. This is because the number of empirically measured samples found in the tail of 
the distribution is often too limited for robust inference. Another concern is that the samples of a 
cumulative distribution function are not independent, whereas regression assumes data independence.     
Clauset and colleagues developed a more principled approach based on maximum likelihood 
estimation to test and compare different statistical models of the data, including the power law, but 
also other candidate heavy tailed distributions including the log normal and stretched exponential 
forms (Clauset et al., 2009; Vuong, 1989). In brief, once the best fitting power-law parameters for an 
empirical dataset have been determined with maximum likelihood estimation, the goodness-of-fit 
between the fitted power law and empirical distribution is tested with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) 
statistic. To this end, Clauset and colleagues proposed to randomly sample data from the fitted power 
law, independently fit a new power law to each of these new data samples and then evaluate the 
goodness-of-fit between the new samples and the new power laws. This is repeated many times to 
generate an empirical distribution of K-S statistics, which can then be used to compute a p-value for 
the K-S statistic corresponding to the observed data. If this p-value is significant, the randomly 
sampled data is a better fit to the power law than the observed data, and thus a power law should be 
excluded as an appropriate model. Otherwise, if the p-value is not significant, power-law behaviour is 
supported and the final step is to exclude other distributions as providing better evidence. Relative fits 
are typically computed between candidate distributions (lognormal, stretched exponentials, etc.) using 
log-likelihoods.  
 
Using this approach, Clauset et al. (2009) revisited several physical phenomena thought to have scale-
free statistics and showed that several of these data were better explained by other long-tailed 
distributions, not power laws. Using these methods shows that the same holds true for many neuronal 
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fluctuations (Roberts et al., 2014a). For example, it appears that fluctuating alpha rhythm follows a 
stretched exponential distribution, not a power law (Freyer et al., 2009). In turn, biophysical models 
suggest that the alpha rhythm arises from noise-driven multistability, rather than being generated by 
classic (super-) criticality (Freyer et al., 2011). 
 
A second caveat was issued by the empirical analyses and modelling work of Tomboul and Destexhe 
(Touboul and Destexhe, 2010, 2015) who showed that under certain situations, the aggregate 
behaviour of non-critical stochastic systems could yield irregular time series with power law statistics, 
albeit over a limited range. This is an important issue which also highlights the importance of null 
models for the different experimental methods (Farmer, 2015). These findings suggest that inferences 
regarding criticality based on the observation of power law scaling in empirical data should be made 
with caution, particularly if the scaling extends for less than two orders of magnitude or the slope of 
the power law is steep (Miller et al., 2009) - i.e. the scaling exponent  is greater than 2.5.  
 
A third caveat concerns other classes of interesting, emergent phenomena. Non-trivial, emergent 
dynamics can arise through other complex nonlinear phenomena. A classic example is that of so-
called winnerless competition (Melbourne et al., 1989; Rabinovich et al., 2001) that has been 
proposed to underlie cognitive tasks such as animal gait (Golubitsky et al., 1999), perceptual rivalry 
(Ashwin and Lavric, 2010), and sequential decision-making (Rabinovich et al., 2008). Winnerless 
competition arises from metastable transitions along a sequence of unstable states (not unlike the 
drawings of M.C. Esher). Unlike criticality, the successive states are not weakly stable, but are 
unstable (Figure 4). In common with critical systems, noise plays a crucial role in a metastable 
system. However, the statistics of a metastable system are not power laws (Figure 4b). Rather the 
duration that the system dwells near each of its states varies in proportion to the logarithm of the noise 
amplitude (Ashwin et al., 2006). The temporal statistics therefore have a characteristic (and relatively 
short) time scale, and are not scale-free (Figure 4b). While multistable (Figure 4a) and metastable 
(Figure 4b) systems are therefore related (particularly in name!), their statistics are distinct and the 
underlying nonlinear causes differ. Unfortunately, the two terms are often used interchangeably.  
 
A number of final caveats pertain to the practical aspects of empirical data. First, the algorithm 
developed by Clauset et al. (2009) assumes that there is no upper bound to the empirical power-law 
distribution. This is a flawed assumption for most experimental data, which inevitably derive from a 
finite number of sensors, and may bias model selection. Recent work has revisited this assumption, 
developing methods that test the likelihood of a power law with a simple cut-off (Langlois et al., 
2014; Shew et al., 2015). Second, as mentioned above, the range of many data tested for power law 
scaling often span less than two orders of magnitude, yielding data that is particularly sparse in the 
right-hand tail (precisely where power law scaling is most clearly expressed). Although the use of 
model estimation rather than linear regression partly mitigates this, disambiguating amongst the 
variety of candidate heavy-tailed distributions can only be reliably performed when the data scale 
over more than two orders of magnitude. Lengthy acquisitions may help here. For example, free-
living activity patterns in humans derived from accelerometry recordings over seven consecutive days 
scale across four orders of magnitude: These allow for disambiguation of composite exponential and 
truncated power law distributions in active versus inactive periods of the day (Chapman et al., 2016).  
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Figure 4: Different expressions of instability lead to different types of complex dynamics. (a) In a multistable 
system, noise drives a system erratically between different attractors. Because the system is briefly trapped in 
each basin of attraction, the time series shows a relatively long-tailed (stretched exponential) dwell 
distribution, here shown in linear-log coordinates (inset). (b) In a metastable system, there are no attractors, 
but rather a sequence of linked unstable fixed points. Because these are only weakly unstable, the system 
dwells in the neighbourhood of each, but does not show trapping. The sequential dwell times are therefore 
not long-tailed but show a characteristic time-scale corresponding to the peak in a gamma function shown 
here in linear coordinates (inset). In a critical system, a single fixed point is very weakly attracting or neutral. 
System noise leads to long and unstructured excursions corresponding to scale-free fluctuations and 
corresponding power-law statistics. Disambiguating these different underlying causes of complex dynamics 
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can be achieved with careful analyses of the system statistics, together with inversion of corresponding 
computational models. 
 
Finally, noisy fluctuations in physiological data do not only arise from the system of interest (i.e. 
neural activity), but also from the imperfect measurement process: In the setting of 
neurophysiological data, these fluctuations consist of additive noise from physiological sources (such 
as muscular activity, cardiovascular influences) as well as artefacts due to extraneous effects (e.g. 
thermal scanner noise, head motion). In principle, such effects could lead to false positives in power-
law evaluation. However, these inputs are generally uncorrelated and their summation therefore 
(according to the central limit theorem) likely to be Gaussian, not heavy-tailed. Nonetheless, care 
should be taken to disambiguate their contribution to any putative heavy-tailed system statistics in 
case one particular artefact (such as head movement in the scanner) dominates. Methods of doing this 
include: (i) taking independent measurements of these artefacts, such as taking empty scanner room 
recordings (Shriki et al., 2013) and ensuring that they do not possess the same statistics as attributed 
to the underlying neuronal system (Kitzbichler et al., 2009); (ii) using algorithms such as independent 
components analysis or source reconstruction to unmix neuronal fluctuations from physiological and 
measurement noise (Freyer et al., 2009); (iii) and using a formal inversion framework that formally 
accommodates measurements effects including spatial or temporal filtering and additive noise (Razi et 
al., 2015). 
 
These caveats highlight crucial points. While the application of criticality to neuroscience is an 
exciting field, progress needs to proceed with due caution. Analyses of neuroscience data for power 
laws first needs to consider other heavy-tailed candidate distributions. Second, inference should 
ultimately be based upon models of the causes of the observed statistics and avoid a direct inference 
of criticality that is based only upon data analysis. Third, computational models of neural systems that 
are based upon criticality should be tested closely against empirical data using appropriate 
frameworks (Daunizeau et al., 2009; Penny, 2012) that allow disambiguation against competing 
models that invoke other nonlinear mechanisms [for review, see Roberts et al. (2015)]. 
 
While these caveats highlight important limitations, experimental manipulations and recent theoretical 
developments offer new opportunities to explore the “criticality hypothesis”. As noted at the outset of 
this review, the notion of universality (properties that transcend the details of a particular system and 
are thus found in many diverse settings) is one of the central appeals of criticality. Universal scaling 
laws - such as the presence of a scaling function that inter-relates the common underlying shape of 
critical fluctuations across temporal and spatial scales (Sethna et al., 2001; Zapperi et al., 2005) - can 
be extracted from data and subject to null hypothesis testing (Friedman et al., 2012; Roberts et al., 
2014a). Relationships between the exponents of different (spatial and temporal) scaling laws, may 
also be derived from empirical data (Friedman et al., 2012; Roberts et al., 2014a) and benchmarked 
against the simple relationships predicted by the mathematical theory of phase transitions (Sethna et 
al., 2001). Also, as reviewed above, the theoretical advantages of criticality in neuronal models was 
demonstrated in a series of elegant empirical studies using pharmacological manipulation to sweep 
systems from subcritical to critical to supercritical (Gautam et al., 2015; Shew et al., 2011; Shew et 
al., 2009; Tagliazucchi et al., 2016): Showing a sudden change in a scaling law, corresponding to a 
peak in information capacity or dynamic range, provides convergent evidence for the occurrence of a 
phase transition in the underlying system. 
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5. Emerging role of criticality in cognition 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned caveats, growing empirical and modelling research clearly 
supports the view that neural dynamics likely occur near critical instabilities. The recognition of the 
limitations of this new field simply shows that it has matured beyond the “proof of principle” stage 
(Feyerabend, 1993). The scene is thus set for the translation of criticality into cognitive and clinical 
brain research.  
 
In Section 3.1, we noted a canonical example of critical fluctuations near the transition from anti-
syncopated to syncopated rhythmic finger tapping. Do critical dynamics generalize to other 
behaviours? Accelerometer-based analyses of free behaviour in humans (going about their everyday 
lives) shows that periods of inactivity exhibit power-law statistics (Nakamura et al., 2007), whose 
scaling coefficients differ between wake and sleep (Chapman et al., 2016) and differ again in major 
depression (Nakamura et al., 2008). Intriguingly, accumulating evidence suggests that periods of 
activity – although long-tailed – do not fit a power law, but rather a stretched exponential (e.g., inset 
Figure 4a, depicting the Weibull distribution). This shift in the statistical proprieties of a system as a 
function of context is emerging as a powerful tool to understand the neural principles supporting 
healthy and pathological brain functions.  
5.1. Criticality in brain and behaviour 
In traditional cognitive neuroscience experiments, separate trials are typically treated as independent. 
However, they are not necessarily treated independently by research participants. Indeed it has been 
shown that reaction times between sequential trials show long-range correlations across a wide 
diversity of tasks (Palva and Palva, 2011; Thornton and Gilden, 2005). This is perhaps not surprising, 
given that, outside the scanner, human activity (Sreekumar et al., 2016; Sreekumar et al., 2014) and 
memory (Nielson et al., 2015) show a complex temporal structure that scales across many orders of 
magnitude. Detailed analyses of reaction time data in typical psychophysics experiments support the 
presence of a power law structure (Van Orden et al., 2005). However, definitive support for this 
position, as well as putative underlying causes such as criticality, do remain contentious (Heathcote et 
al., 2000; Heathcote et al., 1991; Wagenmakers et al., 2004).  
 
A rich literature on critical dynamics in brain and behaviour exists. However, with few notable 
exceptions (Jirsa et al., 1994; Kelso et al., 1992), these two streams of research have preceded largely 
in parallel. Several recent papers have stepped toward a unifying framework. By acquiring high 
density MEG/EEG data while participants performed an audiovisual threshold-stimulus detection task 
Palva et al. (Palva et al., 2013) showed that the critical exponents of scale-free neuronal dynamics 
correlate with the inter-individual variability in behavioural scaling laws. These correlations, show a 
specific anatomical pattern, with the combined delta and alpha frequency bands correlations mapping 
onto posterior parietal cortex. The same cortical areas appear to be involved when 
electrophysiological signals in the beta and gamma ranges are considered, with the addition of the 
cuneus and inferotemporal brain areas. Interestingly, a significant association between neural and 
behavioural long-range temporal correlations was also found in brain regions comprising the default 
mode brain network (Greicius et al., 2003). Notably, the brain-behaviour association found in task 
execution largely overlaps with an association between visual behavioural performances and scale-
free dynamics observed in resting-state MEG data. This suggests that the temporal structure of 
endogenous neural dynamics are, to some extent, preserved during task performance. Similarly, the 
analysis of auditory task data showing that cortical activations organize as neural avalanches in both 
visual cognitive and resting-state contexts [(Arviv et al., 2015), see also (Shew et al., 2015)]. 
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Moreover, near-critical neural dynamics may determine fluctuations in perceptual and cognitive 
processes. Overall, these findings highlight the strong interdependence between the near-critical 
neural processes characterizing resting-state and task-specific processes.  
5.2. Suppression of criticality during task performance 
Using simultaneously acquired EEG and fMRI data, Fagerholm et al (Fagerholm et al., 2015) recently 
recapitulated previous findings of scale-free cortical dynamics at rest [e.g., (Palva et al., 2013)]. 
However, as participants engaged in tasks of increasing attentional load, the statistics of cortical 
activity appeared to shift increasingly further from the critical state. It was surmised that although 
criticality was important for the unconstrained “exploratory” resting-state, executing specific tasks 
required suppression of the associated variability under the influence of dorsal attentional networks 
(Fagerholm et al., 2015; Hellyer et al., 2014). In keeping with this notion, complementary 
computational analyses have suggested that altered anatomical connectivity, cognitive flexibility and 
information processing following traumatic brain injury are linked to a reduction in the variance of 
functional connectivity simulated by a model of coupled phase oscillators (Hellyer et al., 2014).  
 
The proposition that near-critical neural dynamics are central to the emergence of conscious cognition 
is consistent with the results of high-density electrocorticography recordings (ECoG) in primates, 
showing that loss of consciousness is characterized by a reduction in the number of eigenmodes (the 
number of “excited modes” in a dynamic system) that are close to instability (Solovey et al., 2015). 
Conversely, the return of consciousness appears to be accompanied by a corresponding increase in the 
number of eigenmodes close to instability. Recent detailed analyses of in vivo electrophysiological 
and two-photon recordings in rodents provide direct support for a clear association between the 
appearance of critical activity and the emergence of consciousness from anaesthesia (Bellay et al., 
2015; Scott et al., 2014). Likewise, induction of unconsciousness through propofol anaeasthesia is 
accompanied by a loss of the signatures of criticality in fMRI data (Tagliazucchi et al., 2016). 
 
Non-invasive and invasive human neuroimaging work assessing neural critical states by the mean of 
neural avalanches analysis further support the link between near-critical neural regimes and behaviour 
(Palva et al., 2013; Priesemann et al., 2013; Tagliazucchi et al., 2012). For example, ECoG data 
collected from patients with refractory partial epilepsy were analysed as a function of vigilance 
(Priesemann et al., 2013). In general, the probability distribution frequency of neural avalanches 
followed a power law. However, slow wave sleep (SWS) was characterized by the most frequent 
occurrence of avalanches; unconstrained wakefulness showed an intermediate occurrence, while rapid 
eye movement sleep (REM) showed the fewest. These results are in line with previous findings from 
invasive recording in rats (Ribeiro et al., 2010) and highlight the close relationship between changes 
in near-critical dynamics and distinct mental states.  
 
It has been suggested that near-critical dynamics in the default mode operate to increase the “dynamic 
repertoire” of the brain when subjects are at rest (Deco and Jirsa, 2012; Deco et al., 2011) – that is, to 
increase the number of proximal “cognitive sets” or stored memories (Scarpetta and de Candia, 2013). 
This is consistent with modelling and empirical work, reviewed above, that reveals that criticality 
optimizes the entropy (Fagerholm et al., 2016) and information capacity (Shew et al., 2011) of 
spontaneous neuronal activity. Criticality at rest could also function to tune cortical dynamics to an 
optimal state of “expected uncertainty” concerning the nature of as yet unencountered sensory inputs 
(Friston et al., 2012b). That is, by facilitating a flexible, but also constrained degree of instability in 
sensory-perceptual systems, criticality could endow the cortex with the ability to adapt to volatile and 
non-stationary environmental fluctuations: Away from the critical point, internal fluctuations are 
Criticality in the brain   Cocchi et al. 25 
 
 25 
stable and strongly damped, hence shrinking toward a baseline (mean) value. Close to the critical 
point, such fluctuations encompass a broad spectrum of scales, similar to the scale-invariant statistics 
of natural scenes (Field, 1987; Ruderman and Bialek, 1994). At a very fundamental level, this 
matching of internally-generated fluctuations to the statistics of external scenes, via criticality, revisits 
the notion that spontaneous cortical activity encodes an optimal model of the environment (Berkes et 
al., 2011) and uses this to deploy adaptive behavioural strategies (Fiser et al., 2010), including 
saccadic (Friston et al., 2012a) and heavy-tailed fixational eye movements (Roberts et al., 2013). 
Upon task execution - as uncertainty decreases - this unstable dynamic landscape could accordingly 
be suppressed, allowing stabilization of a single task-related attractor. Such proposals are consistent 
with the broader recognition that “brain noise” plays an adaptive role in health (Garrett et al., 2011) 
and ageing (McIntosh et al., 2010), but decreases during task execution (Churchland et al., 2010; 
Ponce-Alvarez et al., 2015).  
By analysing the statistics and spatiotemporal scaling laws of neural avalanches from ex vivo local 
field potential (LFP) recordings of visual cortex, Shew et al. (2015) showed that strong visual 
stimulation initially engendered super-critical dynamics. However, with the continuation of the visual 
input, these were quickly tuned to a critical state through neuronal adaptation. A simple neuronal 
model with the adaptation to input mediated by short-term synaptic depression was able to capture the 
switch from non-critical to critical activity with continuous input (Shew et al., 2015). These results 
highlight the importance of synaptic plasticity in switching between critical and non-critical regimes 
in order to facilitate perception and cognition.   
 
6. Criticality in disease 
6.1. Bifurcations and seizures 
Whereas the role of criticality in cognition is relatively nascent, casting seizures as dynamic disorders 
that arise out of critical instabilities is supported by an appreciable body of evidence (Da Silva et al., 
2003; Meisel et al., 2012). The primary generalized seizures of childhood - Absence seizures – 
correspond to the presence of high amplitude 3 Hz spike-and-wave oscillations that appear and 
terminate equally quickly. These seizures have been modelled as critical bifurcations in 
corticothalamic loops by several groups (Destexhe and Sejnowski, 2001) although there is yet a lack 
of consensus as to whether these bifurcations are subcritical (Fröhlich et al., 2010; Suffczynski et al., 
2004) or supercritical (Breakspear et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2002). Generalised tonic-clonic 
seizures, which are associated with the progression of various high amplitude waveforms, have been 
modelled as a subcritical bifurcation (Breakspear et al., 2006). Accordingly, patients with epilepsy 
“reside” in pathological multistable dynamic regimes, due to neurophysiological disturbances and are 
occasionally perturbed into seizure dynamics (Breakspear et al., 2006). Fast epileptic activity 
recorded invasively with cortical surface recordings have also been subject to detailed models using 
critical bifurcations (Bartolomei et al., 2001; Wendling et al., 2005). These are proposed to reflect 
aberrant interactions between excitatory and inhibitory cortical neurons due to GABA-ergic 
dysfunction (Wendling et al., 2002). A detailed account of the complex progression of low frequency 
(DC-like) shifts in the electrical baseline and the nested high frequency oscillations that superimpose 
on these has recently been advanced using bifurcations: This “epileptor” - a set of equations that 
express the corresponding nested bifurcations -  represents a comprehensive integration of slow and 
fast time scales underlying criticality and bifurcations in seizure activity (Jirsa et al., 2017; Jirsa et al., 
2014). 
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6.2. Crackling noise and neonatal burst-suppression 
Burst suppression (BS) is a class of electrocortical activity that occurs in preterm neonates, full-term 
newborn infants with encephalopathy, and following propofol anaesthesia. BS is characterised by 
high amplitude, irregular bursts that erratically punctuate a flat EEG trace (Niedermeyer et al., 1999) 
(Figure 5). Analyses of BS in preterm and encephalopathic infants show that the bursts are 
characterized by long-tailed, scale-free properties that stretch across a remarkable six orders of 
magnitude (Roberts et al., 2014a). While individual bursts are highly irregular, binning them 
according to their size and then averaging all bursts within each bin yields very smooth shapes that 
vary only slowly across scales (Roberts et al., 2014a) (Figure 5). The relationship between these 
scale-specific shapes are described by a so-called scaling function that speaks to the nature of 
criticality in all systems where it arises (Baldassarri et al., 2003; Papanikolaou et al., 2011). Notably, 
the exponents that describe the scaling and shape of the bursts pre-empt clinical outcomes in these 
neonates (Iyer et al., 2015b; Iyer et al., 2014). These shapes have been modelled by a term that 
describes metabolic depletion and replenishment in these critically vulnerable newborn brains 
(Roberts et al., 2014a). Despite the success in modelling BS in babies using a criticality framework, 
bursts in propofol anaesthesia do not have scale-free properties (Ching et al., 2010). In contrast, the 
effect of this type of anaesthesia in brain activity has been modelled with alternative (non-critical) 
dynamical mechanisms (Bojak et al., 2015). 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Critical statistics in neonatal hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy. (a) Scalp EEG channels show 
characteristic bursting pattern of activity with bursts erratically punctuating a flat EEG trace. (b) The area 
under each of these bursts (a measure of the energy discharged) shows power-law scaling over 3 orders of 
magnitude, with an exponential truncation at the far right. (c) The relationship between the length and 
duration of bursts also follows a power law (linear in double logarithmic coordinates. (d) Bayesian model 
selection shows that a truncated power law is easily the best model for these data. Panels (a) adapted from 
(Iyer et al., 2015a); panels (b), (c) and (d) adapted from (Roberts et al., 2014a). 
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Establishing the presence of critical instabilities in neurological disorders opens a number of novel 
therapeutic and diagnostic windows [for review, see Coombes and Terry (2012)]. For example, in 
concert with computational modelling, treating seizures as transitions across bifurcations permits 
tracking the trajectory of the seizure through bifurcation space (Freestone et al., 2013; Nevado-
Holgado et al., 2012), with a longer-term objective of seizure control (Nelson et al., 2011). 
Intriguingly, such control systems could use micro-stimulation to exploit the increased dynamic 
responsiveness of a system close to criticality as an “early warning system” (Scheffer et al., 2009): To 
our knowledge, incorporating this approach to seizure prediction within the framework of criticality 
theory has not yet been achieved. Likewise, deriving measures of near-criticality from clinical, bed-
side recordings of burst suppression in preterm and encephalopathic neonates could be used as 
prognostic markers of long-term outcome, hence opening novel therapeutic windows for early 
intervention (Roberts et al., 2017). 
6.3. Criticality and neuropsychiatric disorders 
Criticality, bifurcations and phase transitions have provided increasingly nuanced understandings of 
several major neurological conditions. It is intriguing to consider a possible role in neuropsychiatric 
conditions such as psychotic and affective disorders, although these are likely to be more subtle in 
their deviation from the “optimum critical point”. Cognitive disturbances in schizophrenia, such as 
working memory, have been captured in computational models by changing the influence of 
fluctuations in a multistable landscape (Loh et al., 2007). Changes in large-scale resting-state 
dynamics seen in this disorder – such as a decrease in the global brain signal – have also been 
modelled by altering the balance of noise and stability in macroscopic neuronal activity (Yang et al., 
2014). Schizophrenia is associated with less suppression of activity in the default-mode network when 
subjects engage in external tasks (Harrison et al., 2007; Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2001; Nejad et al., 
2011; Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2009). Dynamic insights into this loss of efficiency could draw from 
the theory of criticality. In particular, if adaptive cortical activity reflects a switch from sub-critical to 
super-critical activity under the influence of attention and arousal, then it follows that the precision of 
this process could be diminished in schizophrenia. Default activity would then be inadequately 
suppressed during attention to external tasks, while super-critical activity would not be optimally 
portioned into distinct spatiotemporal patterns. While this is clearly speculative, the tools of criticality 
provide new methodological tools and innovative directions for research in this often-intractable 
disorder. 
 
Whereas schizophrenia is characterized by disorganization – suggesting too little stability – core 
manifestations of other psychiatric disorders suggest too much stability. The ruminations of 
depressive disorders and the maladaptive pre-occupations of obsessive-compulsive disorder may arise 
in a system residing too deeply in the subcritical zone, preventing adaptive switching from 
interospective to exteroceptive states. Analysis of resting-state fMRI from patients with melancholia 
supports this view, showing a disturbance in the key dynamic parameters that modulate stability 
(Hyett et al., 2015a). Notably, when patients with melancholia view emotionally salient material, 
frontal attentional networks increase system stability, contrary to their influence in healthy controls 
(Hyett et al., 2015b). As noted above, critical instability is needed for a system to respond to the 
stream of stimuli. Here, too little instability is proposed to underlie the lack of reactivity.  
 
Although these are preliminary findings, the potential for criticality to provide fresh insights into 
tough neuropsychiatric research problems is again evident. It is quite possible that psychiatric 
phenotypes do not only reflect a simple failure of critical brain dynamics, but also their replacement 
by different dynamic processes in compensation (Breakspear et al., 2015).  
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7. Summary 
Evidence for the widespread occurrence of criticality in nature, and its corresponding computational 
advantages, has triggered the interest of scientists in many different fields. The list of advantages 
associated with criticality spans many systems and different measurable quantities (Assis and Copelli, 
2008; Boedecker et al., 2012; Deco et al., 2013; Gollo et al., 2013; Haldeman and Beggs, 2005; 
Hidalgo et al., 2014; Kastner et al., 2015; Legenstein and Maass, 2007; Livi et al., 2016; Mosqueiro 
and Maia, 2013; Publio et al., 2012; Schrauwen et al., 2009; Shew and Plenz, 2013). Despite the field 
traditionally developing outside of neuroscience, many of the most exciting findings now focus on 
brain dynamics. This body of work suggests that specific functions of the central nervous system may 
exploit optimal properties observed at criticality, representing a general functional property of the 
brain (Chialvo, 2006).  
 
What are the mechanisms that establish criticality in the brain? The obvious lack of an externally 
tunable parameter highlights the importance of self-organized criticality (SOC). As we reviewed 
above, SOC arises when the interactions between the elements (neurons) of a system are endowed 
with plasticity, or when there is a slow build-up and a fast release of energy. Synaptic processes such 
as frequency adaptation or spike-time dependent plasticity are clear candidates for SOC at the 
neuronal level. Homeostatic mechanisms, such as the hypothalamus-pituitary axis, govern metabolic 
processes in the body, and reflect the slow time-scales of energy accumulation and utilization. In this 
vein, neuronal criticality may extend beyond the central nervous system to incorporate the autonomic 
nervous system and corresponding interoceptive feedback loops to the midbrain and insula. Although 
criticality can arise from a fairly simple memory process, it seems unlikely to be confined to any 
single mechanism in the brain, but may reflect multiple processes operating for different goals 
(computation, adaptation, homeostasis). Likewise, changes in the environment, such as a scarcity of 
food sources, which mandate an (allostatic) change in the balance of energy metabolism may also 
engage SOC processes through a change in the critical set point. These more complex feedback 
systems are not classically thought of as SOC, but rather homeostatic, self-regulatory systems of the 
brain and body. Future work is required to understand if these broader homeo- and allostatic processes 
do follow the principles of SOC. 
 
Conversely, pathological failures of adaptive criticality may reflect disturbances in any of the 
supporting mechanisms, such as when a failure of balanced inhibition leads to a seizure, or when 
interoceptive disturbances lead to fatigue and depression (Petzschner et al., 2017). Criticality may 
also arise in pathological settings, such as if metabolic disturbances lead to an abnormal build-up and 
release of energy that would not normally occur: Burst suppression in the hypoxic newborn may be an 
example of this scenario (Roberts et al., 2015). 
 
The study of the brain as a complex, dynamic network is now flourishing. Modelling the inherently 
unstable, multiscale neuronal dynamics that generate flexible cognitive states is crucial to this 
endeavour. Although the notion of criticality is an attractive candidate, much work remains to be done 
to clarify the relationship between cognition and criticality. The increasing sophistication of 
theoretical models and their hypothesis-driven application to empirical data has to be tempered 
against the caveats that have recently emerged. Research that incorporates these lessons will shed new 
light on the dynamic brain networks that underlie action, perception and cognition in health and 
disease. 
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Unifying models of brain function give sense to the results generated by the boom of explorative 
studies assessing the association between cognitive functions and neural dynamics. Without such 
models, there is a risk that the accumulation of experimental evidence will not substantially impact 
upon our understanding of the neural underpinnings of human cognition in health and disease. Recent 
studies suggest that the transition from critical to super-critical regimes may represent a general 
principle underlying the emergence of goal-directed behaviour. Those transitions may be moderated 
by slow integrators that are the highly connected hubs of the brain. In general, the framework of 
criticality challenges earlier prevailing conceptualizations of normal and pathological cognitive 
functions as emerging from discrete regions or static networks of brain regions.  
 
The science of criticality provides a new armoury of analytic techniques for basic and translational 
neuroscientists. The field is now sufficiently mature that inferring the presence of scale-free statistics 
from time series data should derive from formal likelihood tests and comparisons to other heavy-
tailed processes. In addition, showing that the spatial and/or temporal statistics of a system are scale-
free is now only the first step in emerging “best practice”. Inferring that the underlying system is 
critical should ideally rest upon showing that the best model that can account for those statistics is one 
in which the model itself is perched at the cusp of criticality. Criticality should not become a catch-all 
term for everything that is complex or variable. It is only one amongst many possible causes of 
complex dynamics and care should be taken to disambiguate amongst these. 
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Box 1: Ten-Point Summary 
1. Criticality arises when a system is close to dynamic instability and is reflected by scale-free 
temporal and spatial fluctuations 
2. Critical temporal fluctuations (crackling noise) occur in simple systems close to a bifurcation 
3. Critical spatiotemporal fluctuations (avalanches) occur in complex systems close to a phase 
transition 
4. Crackling noise and avalanches have now been observed in a wide variety of neuronal recordings, 
at different scales, in different species, and in health and disease 
5. Computational models suggest a host of adaptive benefits of criticality, including maximum 
dynamic range, optimal information capacity, storage and transmission and selective enhancement of 
weak inputs 
6. Resting-state EEG and fMRI data show evidence of critical dynamics 
7. The onset of a specific cognitive function may reflect the stabilization of a particular subcritical 
state under the influence of sustained attention 
8. Mounting evidence and models suggest that several neurological disorders such as epilepsies and 
neonatal encephalopathy reflect bifurcations and phase transitions to pathological states  
9. Novel insights into neuropsychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia and melancholia might also be 
obtained by leveraging the tools of criticality, although this currently remains somewhat speculative 
10. While the application of criticality to neuroscience is an exciting field, progress needs to proceed 
with due caution, using appropriate methods, considering alternative complex processes and using 
computational models in partnership with data analysis 
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Box 2: Glossary 
The attractor of a dynamical system is the set of all points traversed once initial transients have 
passed. Attractors can be fixed points (with steady state solutions), limit cycles (periodic) or chaotic 
(deterministic but dynamically unstable and aperiodic). 
 
The basin of attraction of an attractor is the set of all initial conditions that eventually flow onto that 
attractor. 
 
A system can have more than one attractor even if all its parameters are fixed. Such a system is said to 
be multistable. Such systems will also have multiple basins of attraction, separated by basin 
boundaries. Bistability occurs in a multistable system which has exactly two attractors. 
 
A metastable system does not have any attractors. It instead has a series of saddles (fixed points with 
attracting and repelling subspaces) that are linked into a complex (heteroclinic) cycle. A metastable 
system will jump endlessly from the neighborhood of one saddle to another. Metastable systems are 
also called winnerless competition. 
 
An attractor that only changes slightly (and smoothly) when its underlying parameters are changes is 
said to be structurally stable. If the topology (shape) of the attractor fundamentally changes then the 
attractor is said to be unstable – or, alternatively undergo a bifurcation. The value of the parameter at 
which that discontinuous change occurs is said to be a critical or bifurcation point.  
 
A system consisting of many interacting components may exhibit a sudden change in state in the 
presence of a slowly tuned control parameter (such as temperature). Such a transition is called a 
phase transition and typically separates an ordered from a disordered state. Technically, a phase 
transition corresponds to a discontinuity in the thermodynamic free energy of a system. 
 
Criticality occurs when a system is poised at the point of a dynamic instability. Because of this, 
microscopic fluctuations are not damped but instead appear at all scales of the system. This yields 
power-law fluctuations in the temporal domain (“crackling noise”) and the spatiotemporal domain 
(“avalanches”). A critical system will show scaling laws, such that a single (universal) function can 
map the shape of fluctuations at any scale into those at the scale above (or below). 
 
Bifurcations may be super-critical (when stable oscillations appear above the critical point) or sub-
critical (when a zone of bistability occurs below the critical point). Only supercritical bifurcations can 
yield power law (critical) fluctuations: Sub-critical bifurcations lead to multistable switches that occur 
on a characteristic time scale. 
 
Phase transitions may be continuous (second order) or discontinuous (first order). Mathematically, 
these are equivalent to a super- and sub-critical bifurcations, respectively. As with bifurcations, 
critical power law fluctuations only occur in the neighbourhood of a continuous phase transition. 
Discontinuous phase transitions can yield multistable switching or complex mixtures of states (such as 
in boiling water). 
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Some systems need to be externally tuned by a control parameter close to their critical point. In other 
systems, criticality will emerge from many initial parameter values, usually due to plasticity and 
memory. 
 
The order parameter of a complex system is a macroscopic observable such as the magnetic field of a 
ferromagnet. A non-zero order parameter arises in the ordered state of a system, in the supercritical 
(or active) phase. In the subcritical phase, the order parameter remains at zero even with the addition 
of energy. Such a state is called an absorbing state. 
 
A power law exists between two variables x and y if they obey the relationship: 𝑦 ∝ 𝑥−𝑘. If the power 
law arises in the setting of criticality, then the constant k is called the critical exponent. A system 
shows power law behaviour if the probability density function of its fluctuations obeys 𝑓(𝑥)  ∝
𝑥−𝑘 for all values of x greater than some minimum cut-off 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛.  A power law probability distribution 
is also called a Pareto distribution. The corresponding cumulative distribution obeys 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑋 > 𝑥) ∝
1 − (𝑥 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛⁄ )
−𝑘+1
 for the same critical exponent k.  
 
A system is said to be scale-free when it doesn’t have a characteristic time or length scale. Scale-free 
systems show a power law probability distribution over several orders of magnitude with an exponent 
k that is less than 2. Correspondingly, the variance of a scale-free system is only bounded by the 
system size. 
 
A complex system shows evidence of slowing down when it is close to a critical point – that is, the 
time scale of its fluctuations (the characteristic return to the mean) slow down, changing from a fast 
(exponential) process to a slow power law. 
 
A system has an exponential distribution when its probability density function is given by 𝑓(𝑥) ∝
 𝑒−𝑥/𝐿. The system has a single time scale, corresponding to the constant exponent L.  
 
Any distribution whose probability distribution drops off more slowly than an exponential distribution 
is said to be heavy-tailed. The Pareto distribution 𝑓(𝑥) ∝  𝑥−𝑘 is a classic heavy tailed distribution but 
log-normal and stretched exponential (Weibull) distributions are also heavy-tailed.  
 
Many physical systems close to a critical point do have some weak damping that acts on the largest 
fluctuations: These systems show an exponentially-truncated power law, 𝑓(𝑥) ∝  𝑥−𝑘𝑒−𝑥𝑙. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
